

15 September 1954

RECOMMENDATION #6

The Deputy Director (Administration) and the Director of Security in coordination with the Deputy Director (Plans) should study the problem of emergency destruction and make recommendations to the DCI as to where responsibilities lie and how a flexible emergency program on a world-wide scope can be developed and implemented.

ACTION

25X1 In July 1953 the Emergency Planning Officer conferred with the DD/P Paramilitary Staff to initiate action to promulgate policy guidance governing emergency planning for overseas field stations, including emergency relocation and destruction. Following this conference, DD/P-PW prepared a proposed [] Regulation for this purpose, concurred in by the Emergency Planning Officer and submitted to the staffs and area divisions of DD/P for concurrence. Up to this date such concurrence has never been obtained, and, consequently, the proposed regulation never issued. The status of this matter has, from time to time, been reviewed and discussed with members of the Paramilitary Staff.

25X1A9A In view of the recent reorganization within DD/P abolishing the Paramilitary Staff, and transferring certain of its functions to the Office of the Chief, Planning and Program Coordination Staff of DD/P, the matter has been taken up with [] head of that staff. On 30 August 1954 it was suggested that a letter be prepared and sent through command channels to the senior representatives requesting reports on the status and substance of their local emergency plans so that these could be used as bases for issuance of policy guidance on the subject from the headquarters. [] 25X1A9A
25X1A9A [] was favorably disposed toward this, and it was agreed that a conference will be held some time following 15 September 1954, when appropriate members of the DD/P staff will be available after summer vacations.

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RECOMMENDATION #7

The DD/A should personally review the status of the Agency's Safety Program, and take steps to insure that a program sufficient to meet the demands of the Agency is developed.

ACTION

This Office is prepared to brief the DD/A on the Agency Safety Program at his convenience. This Office has experienced considerable difficulty in finding fully qualified and experienced safety men to fill the two safety officer slots available in this Office. One position has been filled continuously and the second position has only been filled temporarily for a few months. The incumbent of the second position has indicated he intends to leave soon.

With respect to the statement that only one scheduled fire drill took place in 1953, the record shows that nine fire drills were held during that year, but that only one drill had been held in 1954 up to the time of the Inspector General's survey. Subsequent to the Inspector General's survey, there have been seventeen fire drills held. This program of fire drills will continue to receive appropriate attention in the future.

As a matter of interest, the following statistics reflect the activity of the safety officer during the period of January 1954 through July 1954:

Fire and Safety Survey Reports	2
Special Safety Investigations	89
Floor loading decisions	46
Fire Drills (Buildings)	18
C.D. Evacuations (Air Raid Drill)(Buildings)	28
Inspections re Construction, Remodeling, Moving	15
Review of Emergency Evacuation Plans	8
Emergency Planning Conferences and Meetings	12
Safety Meetings	2

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RECOMMENDATION #8

It is undesirable that CIA must depend on a guard force responsible to another agency with full Civil Service job protection. The DD/A and the Director of Security, in collaboration with General Counsel, should determine what administrative and legal problems must be overcome in order to develop a guard force trained and controlled by CIA.

ACTION

The matter of an independent CIA guard force has heretofore been given a great amount of consideration. It has been determined that until the Agency is housed in one building, it is not feasible administratively to establish an independent guard force.

25 September 1951.

RECOMMENDATION #11

25X1 The Director of Security should review critically the justification for each of the [] Agency unlisted telephones and the 162 badges and limited passes issued to non-CIA employees and determine the appropriate action to be taken.

ACTION

On the matter of unlisted telephones, the procedure in the Security Office is to conduct personal interviews with each requester of an unlisted telephone to determine the need from a security viewpoint of such a telephone and to insure that its proposed use is primarily to permit telephone contacts between Headquarters and covert facilities or calls to persons in the Agency from unwitting outsiders without disclosure of Agency interest in pertinent matters or individuals. The use of an unlisted telephone for discussion of classified matter is, of course, prohibited as it is on all telephones.

25X1 As reported by the Inspector General, there are [] unlisted telephones in the Agency. Of this number, [] are in the DB/P complex, [] in the Logistics Office, and [] in the Security Office. The remaining [] are distributed among other offices of the Agency, none of which has more than 5. 25X1 25X1

Since June 1952, this Office has disapproved 17 requests for unlisted telephones on the basis of insufficient security justification.

There is now an established procedure in the Security Office for conducting periodic surveys of unlisted telephones to insure current security needs therefor, and compliance with security requirements. A survey under this procedure is now in progress. It is believed that this inspection procedure will provide adequate control on the justification for unlisted telephones.

With respect to the justification for 162 badges and limited passes issued to non-CIA employees, the policy of this Office is that we accept suitable certification of clearance from the parent agency of the individual

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Recommendation #11 - ACTION, Cont'd.

for whom a limited pass is requested. In the interest of maintaining good public relations with other U.S. Government agencies, and at the same time maintaining what is believed to be adequate security, we obtain the information concerning clearance held by the recipient of the limited pass by means of:

- a) certification being contained in the request
- b) through information concerning the level of clearance held as determined by the Security Control Staff, Security Office
- c) through appropriate inquiry by the Security Office

In addition to the clearance requirements stated above, each request for a limited pass is processed through the following steps:

- a) the request is reviewed to determine the justification for its issuance
- b) it is reviewed from the standpoint of necessity of the subject to visit the buildings specified in the request
- c) pass logs are maintained at each building entrance
- d) a consolidated log is maintained in the Badge Office in which the total number of visits by each pass holder is reflected

Limited passes must be renewed on a yearly basis, at which time justification is re-determined.

It is the opinion of this Office that the requirements and controls in effect are sufficient and appropriate with respect to the issuance and control of limited passes.

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RECOMMENDATION #13

The status of the Inspection Division should be changed from a division to a staff since it is not a line command function.

ACTION

This recommendation was implemented on 29 July 1954.

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RECOMMENDATION #11

The Physical Security Branch should be made a division and five additional people be added to the T/C.

ACTION

Decision on action to change the Physical Security Branch to a division is being withheld pending completion of the current Management survey and a further study of other possible organizational changes within the Security Office structure. However, a request for additional personnel in the Physical Security Branch is presently being prepared at this time for submission to the Personnel Office.

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Recommendation #20 - ACTION, Cont'd.

j. Page 25, paragraph 6, states in part, "However, because of the great expense involved in affixing these devices to the 'safes,' an administrative determination has been made that, at this time, only safes in CIA overseas installations will be equipped with both devices."

This statement is misleading in that action has been taken for all Agency safes, overseas and domestic, to be equipped with a modification increasing their protective qualities.